Gossip protocols aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point or group communications, at a situation in which all the agents know each other secrets. Recently a number of authors studied distributed epistemic gossip protocols. These protocols use as guards formulas from a simple epistemic logic, which makes their analysis and verification substantially easier.
Introduction
Common knowledge is a fundamental notion in epistemic reasoning. It has its origins in the book of the philosopher David Lewis, [19] , and the article of the sociologist Morris Friedell, [15] . By now this concept was applied in many other fields, including artificial intelligence, psychology, computer science, game theory, and logic. An early work on this subject in computer science and logic is discussed in [14] . For more recent accounts and surveys see e.g., [11] and [20] .
Study and use of various logics equipped with the common knowledge operator is a rich field. As example of recent publications let us just mention [7] , where an update logic augmented with common knowledge is investigated, and [21] , where the correctness of epistemic protocols that rely on common knowledge is studied.
The purpose of this article is to investigate common knowledge in the context of a simple epistemic logic proposed in [1] to express and analyze distributed epistemic gossip protocols. Gossip protocols aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point or group communications, at a situation in which all the agents know each other secrets, see, e.g., the early survey [16] or the book coverage [18] . Distributed epistemic gossip protocols were introduced in [6] , and further studied in [5, 17, 1, 12, 9, 10, 8] , where in particular various distributed gossiping protocols, their types, epistemic aspects and objectives, and their interpretation as planning problems were analyzed. Such protocols are strikingly simple in their syntax based on epistemic logic (though not semantics), which makes it easier to reason about them.
In [2] we showed that the distributed epistemic gossip protocols introduced in [1] are implementable and proved that the problems of partial correctness and termination of such protocols are decidable, as well. In [3] we built upon these results and showed that the implementability of a distributed epistemic gossip protocol is a P NP -complete problem, while the problems of its partial correctness and termina-tion are in coNP NP . We also established in [4] that fair termination of the distributed epistemic gossip protocols is decidable, as well.
In this paper we extend the results of [2] to the language that includes the common knowledge operator. Given that common knowledge is equivalent to an infinite conjunction of nested knowledge, these results are non-trivial generalizations of the previous results.
The obtained results clarify when and how common knowledge can arise in the context of gossiping. We prove that three or more agents can have common knowledge only of true statements. This is not the case for two agents, even if they do not communicate. We also show that under some assumptions common knowledge of two agents coincides with the 4th fold iterated knowledge. The main open problem is whether in this context common knowledge can always be reduced to iterated knowledge.
Syntax
The purpose of this paper is to analyze common knowledge in the context of gossip protocols. To describe it we use a simple modal language introduced in [1] , though we allow now the common knowledge operator instead of the agent related knowledge operator.
Throughout the paper we assume a fixed finite set A of at least three agents. We assume that each agent holds exactly one secret and that there exists a bijection between the set of agents and the set of secrets. We denote by P the set of all secrets.
Assume a fixed ordering on the agents. Each call concerns two different agents, say a and b, and is written as ab or (a, b), where agent a precedes agent b in the assumed ordering.
Calls are denoted by c, d. Abusing notation we write a ∈ c to denote that agent a is one of the two agents involved in the call c (e.g., for c := ab we have a ∈ c and b ∈ c).
We consider formulas in an epistemic language L ck defined by the following grammar:
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A and G ⊆ A. Each secret is viewed a distinct constant. We denote the secret of agent a by A, the secret of agent b by B, where a, b ∈ A and A, B ∈ P, and so on. When G is a singleton, say G = {a}, then we write C G as K a , which is the knowledge operator used and studied in the context of this logic in [1] and [2] . We read F a p as 'agent a is familiar with the secret p', K a φ as 'agent a knows that formula φ is true', and C G φ as 'the group of agents G commonly knows that formula φ is true'.
So F a p is an atomic formula, while K a φ and C G φ are compound formulas. In what follows we shall distinguish the following sublanguages of L ck :
• L pr , its propositional part, which consists of the formulas that do not use the C G modalities,
• L wn , which consists of the formulas without the nested use of the C G modalities.
Semantics
We now recall from [1] semantics of the epistemic formulas. To this end we recall first the concept of a gossip situation.
A gossip situation (in short a situation) is a sequence s = (Q a ) a∈A , where Q a ⊆ P for each agent a. Intuitively, Q a is the set of secrets a is familiar with in situation s. The initial gossip situation is the one in which each Q a equals {A} and is denoted by root. We say that an agent a is an expert in a situation s if he is familiar in s with all the secrets.
Below sets of secrets will be written down as lists. E.g., the set {A, B,C} will be written as ABC. Gossip situations will be written down as lists of lists of secrets separated by dots. E.g., if there are three agents, then the gossip situation ({A, B}, {A, B}, {C}) will be written as AB.AB.C.
Each call transforms the current gossip situation by modifying the set of secrets the agents involved in the call are familiar with. Consider a gossip situation s :
This simply says that the only effect of a call is that the secrets are shared between the two agents involved in it.
In [1] computations of the gossip protocols were studied, so both finite and infinite call sequences were used. Here we focus on the finite call sequences as we are only interested in the semantics of epistemic formulas. So to be brief, unless explicitly stated, a call sequence is assumed to be finite.
The empty sequence is denoted by ε. We use c to denote a call sequence and C to denote the set of all finite call sequences. Given call sequences c and d and a call c we denote by c.c the outcome of adding c at the end of the sequence c and by c.d the outcome of appending the sequences c and d. We write c ⊑ d to denote the fact that d extends c, i.e., that for some c ′ we have c.c ′ = d.
The result of applying a call sequence to a situation s is defined inductively as follows:
A gossip situation is a set of possible combinations of secret distributions among the agents. As calls progress in sequence from the initial situation, agents may be uncertain about which one of such secrets distributions is the actual one. This uncertainty is captured by appropriate equivalence relations on the call sequences. 
To define semantics of the C G operator we use the relation ∼ G ⊆ C × C defined by
, where * stands for the transitive reflexive closure of a binary relation. As stated in [1] , each ∼ a is an equivalence relation. As a result each ∼ G is an equivalence relation, as well.
Finally, we recall the definition of truth. 
When M |= φ we say that φ is true. ✷ So a formula F a p is true whenever secret p belongs to the set of secrets agent a is familiar with in the situation generated by the designated call sequence c applied to the initial situation root. The knowledge operator K a is interpreted as customary in epistemic logic, using the equivalence relations ∼ a , and the C G operator is defined as in [14] . While L ck is a pretty standard epistemic language, its semantics is not. Indeed, it describes the truth of formulas after a sequence of calls took place, by analyzing the statements of the form (M, c) |= φ . So we actually study here a limited version of a dynamic epistemic logic. To put it differently, we actually consider statements of the form [c]φ , where [. . .] is the standard dynamic logic operator, see, e.g., [13] . This explains why the study of the logic L ck cannot be reduced to a study of a routine epistemic logic.
An alternative equivalence relation
To reason about the ∼ a and ∼ G relations it is easier to use an alternative equivalence relation between the call sequences that was introduced in [2] . It is based on a concept of a view of agent a of a call sequence c, written as c a , and defined by induction as follows.
[Base]
ε a := root,
where the gossip situation s is defined by putting for d ∈ A
where s ′ is the last gossip situation in c a .
Intuitively, a view of agent a of a call sequence c is the information he acquires by means of the calls in c he is involved in. It consists of a sequence of gossip situations connected by the calls in which a is involved in. After each such call, say ab, agent a updates the set of gossips he and b are currently familiar with. Thus, in the final gossip situation of this view, agent b is familiar with neither the secret A nor C. ✷ We now introduce for each agent a an equivalence relation ≡ a between the call sequences, defined as follows:
So according to this definition two call sequences are equivalent for agent a if his views of them are the same. Below we shall rely on the following result from [2] .
Theorem 4 (Equivalence) For each agent a the relations ∼ a and ≡ a coincide.
5 Semantic matters
General considerations
We shall need below an alternative definition of truth of the C G φ formulas. Given a sequence a 1 , . . ., a k of elements of G we abbreviate
We also denote the set of finite sequences of elements of G by G * .
Note 5 ([14]) For all call sequences c and formulas C
In other words, the formula C G φ is equivalent to the infinite conjunction t∈G * K t φ . We shall also need the following generalization of the corresponding result from [2] to the logic here studied.
Theorem 6 (Monotonicity) Suppose that φ ∈ L ck is a formula that does not contain the ¬ symbol. Then
Proof. By Note 5 and Monotonicity Theorem 4 of [2] . ✷ Let us focus now on the case of ≥ 3 agents. The following result holds.
Theorem 7 Suppose that |G| ≥ 3. Then for all call sequences c and formulas
Proof. First we prove that for all c and
By the transitivity of ∼ G it suffices to prove that c ∼ G ε. We prove it by induction on the length of c. By definition ε ∼ G ε. Suppose that for some c we have c ∼ G ε and consider a call c. Take a ∈ G such that a ∈ c (it exists since |G| ≥ 3). Then c.c ∼ a c, so c.c ∼ G ε.
By (1) we have (M, c) |= C G φ iff ∀d (M, d) |= φ , which concludes the proof. ✷ Theorem 7 states that the formulas commonly known by the agents in a group of at least three agents are precisely the true formulas. An example of such a statement is that each agent is familiar with his secret, i.e., a∈A F a A. In contrast, a statement that an agent is familiar with the secret of another agent, i.e. F a B, where a = b, is not always true, so for all call sequences c we have (M, c) |= C G F a B, when |G| ≥ 3.
The case of two agents
The situation changes when the group consists of two agents. In what follows we abbreviate C {a,b} to C ab .
It states that if a is familiar with the secret of b, then also another agent different from a and b is familiar with this secret. Note that (M, ab) |= ¬φ , i.e., φ is not always true. We claim that (M, ε) |= C ab φ . Conversely, take a call sequence c such that the call ab does not appear in it. We prove by induction on the length of c that c ∼ {a,b} ε. By definition ε ∼ {a,b} ε. Suppose that for some c we have c ∼ {a,b} ε and consider a call c. Either a ∈ c or b ∈ c, so either c.c ∼ a c or c.c ∼ b c. Consequently c.c ∼ {a,b} ε.
We conclude that c ∼ {a,b} ε iff the call ab does not appear in c. But for any such c we have
This shows that even without any call two agents can commonly know a formula that is not always true. 
Theorem 9 For all call sequences c that do not contain the call ab and all formulas
for arbitrary call sequences c and formulas C ab φ . ✷ Example 8(ii) shows that the restriction that the call ab does not appear in c cannot be dropped and Example 8(i) shows that the claim does not hold for formulas that do contain the ¬ symbol.
Next, we show that for formulas that do not contain the ¬ symbol common knowledge for the group of two agents coincides with the 4th fold iterated knowledge.
Consider an agent a and a call sequence c. We say that a call is a-irrelevant in c if its removal does not affect the view (in the sense of Section 4) of agent a of the call sequence. Starting from c we repeatedly remove from the current call sequence the first not yet analyzed call if it is a-irrelevant and otherwise we keep it. We call the outcome of such an iteration the a-simplification of c. Below we say that two calls are linked if exactly one agent participates in both of them. Consider now a call sequence c with no a-irrelevant calls that does not contain the call ab. We focus on the b-calls in c. By the assumption about c for each b-call c in c there is a sequence of calls c 1 , . . ., c k in c such that
• for i ∈ {1, . . ., k − 1} the calls c i and c i+1 are linked.
• a ∈ c k .
We say then that 
✷
The following lemma establishes the relevant property of R ab (c).
Lemma 13 Consider a call sequence c with no a-irrelevant calls that does not contain the call ab. Then c ≡ a R ab (c).
Proof. Since c does not contain the call ab, the views of a of c and R ab (c) have the same sequences of the a-calls.
By definition agent a does not learn the secret of b through the b-inessential calls for a. So the replacement (or possibly deletion) of b in all b-inessential calls has no effect on the status of this secret in the views of a of both sequences.
Let bc be the first b-inessential for a call in c and suppose that ad is the first a-call in c it leads to. Let c ′ be the outcome of the first step of producing R ab (c)
Consider the c = d case first. The set of secrets an agent is familiar with at the same point in c and c ′ may differ as a result of bc being replaced by cd. However, we argue that it is impossible for the agent a to notice this difference. Let us consider a call ax in c, where x ∈ A and the sets of secrets, S and S ′ , agent e is familiar before ax is made in c and c ′ , respectively.
• If ax takes place before bc then S and S ′ are the same.
• If ax is in-between the calls bc and ad then again the sets S and S ′ are the same, because ad is the first a-call that bc leads to.
• If ax is the call ad then we have the following. First, just before this call a is already familiar with all the secrets b is familiar with before the call bc is made in c, because ad is the first a-call bc leads to. So a is still familiar with all these secrets in c ′ . Thus the only secrets that may be lost by replacing bc by cd are the ones that c is familiar with at that point. However, these secrets are passed to d and a still learns them all in c ′ through the call ad.
• If ax takes place after the call ad then the difference between S and S ′ could be at most in the set of secrets a learned through the call bc. However, a already knows these secrets after the call ad is made, so S = S ′ . 1 The reasoning for the c = d case is completely analogous and omitted. By iterating the above argument, starting with c, we obtain R ab (c) without affecting the view of the agent a. ✷ The following consequence of the above lemma is crucial. Here ≡ abab stands for the the composition of the relations ≡ a , ≡ b , ≡ a and ≡ b , i.e.,
where • is the composition of two binary relations. In particular, this holds for the above call sequence c = ac, bc, ac. ✷ 6 Decidability issues
Decidability of semantics
We begin with the decidability of the semantics. First we establish some properties of the semantics of common knowledge of two agents. Consider a call ab and a call sequence c. Starting from c we repeatedly remove from the current call sequence a redundant call that differs from ab. We call each outcome of such an iteration an ab-reduction of c. Further, we say that a call sequence c is ab-redundant free if no call from c that differs from ab is redundant in it. Clearly each ab-reduction is ab-redundant free. 
Corollary 19 Let d be an ab-reduction of
where m is the length of d, d 0 = ε, and
This sequence monotonically grows, where we interpret the inclusion relation componentwise. Moreover, for all calls d i different from ab the corresponding inclusion is strict. Consequently, m, the length of d, is bounded by k + |A| |A| , the sum of the number of calls ab in c and of the total number of secrets in the gossip situation in which each agent is an expert.
But for each m there are only finitely many call sequences of length at most m. This concludes the proof. ✷ We can now prove the desired result.
Theorem 21 (Decidability of Semantics) For each call sequence c it is decidable whether for a formula
Proof. We use the definition of semantics as the algorithm. We only need to consider the case of the formulas of the form C G φ , where φ ∈ L pr . If |G| = 1, then this is the contents of the Decidability of Semantics Theorem 5 of [2] . If |G| = 2, say A = {a, b}, then according to Corollary 19 we can rewrite the semantics of C G φ as follows:
and according to Lemma 20 this definition refers to a finite set of call sequences d. If |G| ≥ 3, then the decidability follows from Theorem 7 and the Decidability of Truth Theorem 6 established in [2] . ✷ This result implies that the gossip protocols that use guards with non-nested common knowledge operator are implementable.
Decidability of truth
Next, we show that truth definition for the formulas of the language L wn is decidable. Since partial correctness of gossip protocols with common knowledge operator can be expressed as a formula of L wn , this implies that the problem of determining partial correctness of such protocols is decidable.
The key notion is that of an epistemic pair-view. It is a function of a call sequence c, denoted by EPV(c), defined by 
The following holds.
Lemma 22 For each call sequence c and agents a, b, the set EPV(c)(a, b) is finite and can be effectively constructed.
Proof. For any a ∈ A, EPV(c)(a, a) coincides with the epistemic view EV(c)(a), as defined in [2] . Hence, we can compute EPV(c)(a, a) as in Lemma 3 of [2] . Consider now a pair of agents a, b such that a = b. To construct the set EPV(c)(a, b) it suffices by Corollary 19 to consider the ab-redundant free call sequences d and by Lemma 20 there are only finitely many such call sequences d for which d ∼ {a,b} c. ✷ Our interest in epistemic pair-views stems from the following important observation.
Lemma 23 Suppose that EPV(c) = EPV(d). Then for all formulas
Proof. A straightforward proof by induction shows that for a formula ψ ∈ L pr and arbitrary call sequences c ′ and
Since EPV(c)( * ) = c(root) and EPV(d)( * ) = d(root), this settles the case for φ = F a p. Next, consider the case of the formulas of the form C G φ , where φ ∈ L wn . If |G| = 1, then G = {a} for some a ∈ A and C G is the same as K a . Since EPV(c) = EPV(d) implies EV(c) = EV(d), where the epistemic view EV() is defined as in [2] , the claim follows by Lemma 4 of [2] . If |G| = 2, then G = {a, b} for some a, b ∈ A. By (2) and the definition of EPV(c)
So the claim follows since EPV(c)(a, b) = EPV (d)(a, b) .
This settles the case for C G φ . The remaining cases of negation and conjunction follow directly by the induction. ✷ The above lemma is useful because the epistemic pair-view of each call sequence is finite, in contrast to the set of call sequences. Next, we provide an inductive definition of EPV(c.c)(a, b) the importance of which will become clear in a moment. a, b) .
Note that d.c ∼ {a,b} c.c implies that there exists a sequence t 1 . . .t k ∈ {a, b} * such that for some call 
Further, by the definition of the ∼ c relations, we also have that for i ∈ {0, . . 
. ✷ This allows us to conclude that EPV(c.c) can be computed using EPV(c) and c only, i.e., without referring to c. More precisely, denote the set of epistemic pair-views by EPV and recall that C denotes the set of calls. Then the following holds. .c)(a, a) is a function of EPV(c)(a, a) and c. ✷ Consider a call sequence c. If for some prefix c 1 .c 2 of c, we have EPV(c 1 ) = EPV(c 1 .c 2 ), then we say that the call subsequence c 2 is pair-epistemically redundant in c and that c is pair-epistemically redundant.
We say that c is pair-epistemically non-redundant if it is not pair-epistemically redundant. Equivalently, a call sequence c Proof. Note that each epistemic pair-view is a function from A × A ∪ { * } to the set of functions from A to 2 |P| (this is an overestimation because for * this set has only one element). There are k = 2 (|A| 2 +1)·2 |A|·|P| such functions, so any call sequence longer than k has a pair-epistemically redundant call subsequence. But there are only finitely many call sequences of length at most k. This concludes the proof. ✷ Finally, we can establish the announced result.
Theorem 29 (Decidability of Truth) For any formula φ ∈ L wn , it is decidable whether M |= φ holds.
Proof. Recall that M |= φ iff ∀c (M, c) |= φ . By Corollary 27 we can rewrite the latter as ∀c s.t. c is pair-epistemically non-redundant, (M, c) |= φ .
But according to Lemma 28 there are only finitely many pair-epistemically non-redundant call sequences and by Lemma 23 their set can be explicitly constructed. ✷
Decidability of termination with common knowledge operator
Finally, we show that it is decidable to determine whether a gossip protocol that uses guard with nonnested common knowledge operator (in short: a common knowledge protocol) terminates. Note that for any
In fact, all of the elements in this sequence have to be the same, because ≤ A is a partial order. In particular, this shows that Since ≤ EPV is a partial order, EPV(c 1 .c 1 ) = EPV(c 1 ) holds. ✷ Finally we can establish the desired result. In the proof we shall use the following observation. Proof. We first prove that a gossip protocol may fail to terminate iff it can generate a call sequence c.c such that c is pair-epistemically non-redundant and EPV(c.c) = EPV(c).
( ⇒ ) Let c be an infinite sequence of calls generated by the protocol. There are only finitely many pairepistemic views, so some prefix c of c is pair-epistemically redundant. The claim now follows by Lemma 35.
( ⇐ ) Suppose that the protocol generates a sequence of calls c.c such that c is pair-epistemically nonredundant and EPV(c.c) = EPV(c).
Let φ be the guard associated with the call c, i.e., φ → c is a rule used in the considered protocol. By assumption (M, c) |= φ , so by Lemma 23 (M, c.c) |= φ . By the repeated application of the Stuttering Theorem 36 we get that for all i ≥ 1, (M, c.c i ) |= φ . Consequently, c.c ω is an infinite sequence of calls that can be generated by the protocol.
The above equivalence shows that determining whether the protocol always terminates is equivalent to checking that it cannot generate a call sequence c.c such that c is pair-epistemically non-redundant and EPV(c.c) = EPV(c).
But given a call sequence, by the Decidability of Semantics Theorem 21, it is decidable to determine whether it can be generated by the protocol and by Lemma 22 it is decidable to determine whether a call sequence is pair-epistemically non-redundant. Further, by Lemma 28 there are only finitely many pair-epistemically non-redundant call sequences, so the claim follows. ✷
Conclusions
We studied here various aspects of common knowledge in the context of a natural epistemic logic used to express and reason about distributed epistemic gossip protocols. We showed that the semantics and truth in this logic are decidable in the absence of nested modalities. The first result implies that the gossip protocols relying on such a use of the common knowledge operator are implementable and the second one that their partial correctness is decidable, since partial correctness of these gossip protocols can be expressed as a formula of the considered language. Further, we proved that the termination of these gossip protocols is decidable, as well.
There are a number of interesting open problems related to this work. An obvious question is whether our results can be extended to formulas that admit nested modalities.
In Corollary 17 we showed that under certain conditions common knowledge for two agents is equivalent to the 4th fold iterated knowledge. An intriguing question is whether this result holds for arbitrary call sequences and arbitrary formulas. If not, is then common knowledge always equivalent to some finite iterated knowledge?
Finally, it would be interesting to clarify which formulas two agents can commonly know, i.e., given a call sequence c to characterize the formulas φ for which (M, c) |= C ab φ holds. Example 8 indicates that this problem is non-trivial even without any call being performed.
